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Quarles & Brady LLP
Firm State Bar No. 00443100
Renaissance One
Two North Central Avenue
Phoenix, AZ  85004-2391
TELEPHONE 602.229.5200
Deana S. Peck (AZ Bar No. 004243)
dpeck@quarles.com
André H. Merrett (AZ Bar No. 020889)
amerrett@quarles.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Global Royalties, Ltd. 
and Brandon Hall
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Global Royalties, Ltd., a Canadian 
corporation; Brandon Hall, a Canadian 
citizen,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
Xcentric Ventures, L.L.C., an Arizona 
limited liability company d/b/a 
ripoffreport.com and/or 
badbusinessbureau.com; Ed Magedson and 
Jane Doe Magedson, husband and wife,
Defendants.
NO. 2:07-CV-956-PHX-FJM
PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 
DISMISS
Global Royalties, Ltd. and Brandon Hall (collectively “Plaintiffs”) respectfully 
requests that the Court deny Defendants Xcentric Ventures, L.L.C.’s and Edward 
Magedson’s (collectively “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss.
I. INTRODUCTION
In their motion to dismiss, Defendants articulate their theories of defense and/or 
argue what they perceive to be the merits of the case.  Defendants do not genuinely 
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challenge the sufficiency of the pleadings that constitute Plaintiffs’ claims -- the proper 
function of a motion to dismiss.  Moreover, Defendants do not (and cannot) argue that this 
Court, after liberally viewing and construing Plaintiffs’ Complaint in the light most 
favorable to Plaintiffs, must conclude that it is beyond doubt that Plaintiffs can prove no 
set of facts entitling it to relief.  For this reason, Defendants’ motion must be dismissed.
II. ARGUMENT
A. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD.
In considering motions to dismiss, the Court must presume that the plaintiff’s 
allegations are true, and grant the motion only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff 
can prove no set of facts entitling it to relief.  See Resolution Trust Corporation v. Dean, 
854 F.Supp 626, 631-32 (D.Ariz. 1994).  The issue is not whether the plaintiff will 
ultimately prevail, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support its 
claim.  Id.; see also J.K. v. Dillenberg 836 F.Supp 694, 700 (D.Ariz. 1993) (“The purpose 
of a motion to dismiss is to test the formal sufficiency of the pleadings that constitute the 
claim.    A motion to dismiss is not to be  used as a procedure for resolving a contest about 
the facts or the merit of the case.”)  Under this standard, motions to dismiss are viewed 
with disfavor.  Dean, 854 F.Supp. at 632.
It is with this standard in mind that the Court must determine Defendants’ motion.  
Guided by this standard, and appropriately viewing the allegations in Plaintiffs’ 
Complaint, the Court can only conclude that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged facts upon 
which they may be entitled to the enforcement of a foreign judgment against Defendants
and to the recovery of damages against Defendants for their publication of defamatory 
statements.  Accordingly, Defendants’ motion must be dismissed.
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B. PLAINTIFFS HAVE SUFFICIENTLY STATED A CLAIM FOR 
ENFORCEMENT OF A FOREIGN JUDGMENT AGAINST 
DEFENDANTS.
Arizona courts use the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States (the “Restatement”) to analyze whether to recognize and enforce a foreign 
judgment.  Alberta Securities Commission v. Ryckman, 200 Ariz. 540, 545, 30 P.3d 121, 
126 (Ariz. App. 2001).  The Restatement creates a strong presumption of the validity of a 
foreign judgment.  Id.
Pursuant to Section 481 of the Restatement, subject to certain exceptions, a final 
judgment of a foreign court is entitled to recognition in Arizona.  An Arizona court may 
not recognize a judgment of a foreign court if the judgment was rendered under a judicial 
system that does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with due 
process of law or the court that rendered the judgment did not have jurisdiction over the 
defendant in accordance with its laws and the rules set forth in Section 421 of the 
Restatement.  See Restatement at § 482.
As alleged in Plaintiffs’ Complaint, on February 26, 2007 the Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice (the “Ontario Court”) entered its order (the “Ontario Order”) which (a) 
required Defendants to remove statements that Plaintiffs claimed were defamatory from 
the ripoffreport.com website and any other website that Defendants operate; (b) forbade 
Defendants from posting any further defamatory messages concerning Plaintiffs on the 
ripoffreport.com website or any other website that Defendants operate; and (c) referred 
the issue of the amount of damages suffered by Plaintiffs as a result of the defamatory 
statements for trial.  Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that the Ontario Court had subject 
matter jurisdiction over the claims asserted in that action, personal jurisdiction over 
Defendants and that the Ontario Order is a valid act of a foreign court entitled to 
recognition and enforcement in Arizona.  In other words, Plaintiffs have alleged the 
existence of a final judgment of a foreign court that was rendered by a court of competent 
Case 2:07-cv-00956-FJM   Document 16   Filed 08/14/07   Page 3 of 7
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
QBPHX\128716.00002\2114633.1 -4-
jurisdiction in a proceeding that comports with due process of law.  Plaintiffs have
undoubtedly alleged facts upon which they may be entitled to enforcement of the Ontario 
Order.
C. PLAINTIFFS HAVE ALLEGED FACTS SUFFICIENT TO STATE A 
CLAIM FOR DEFAMATION AGAINST DEFENDANTS.
Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants adopted and published false and defamatory 
statements they knew or should have known were false, or that Defendants published the 
defamatory statements in reckless disregard of the truth of falsity of the statements.  
Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants knew or should have known that the false and 
defamatory statements would cause them to suffer pecuniary and reputational harm and 
that the false and defamatory statements have caused such harm.  
In order to prove its defamation claim, a plaintiff must show:
(a) a false and defamatory statement(s);
(b) an unprivileged publication of the statement(s); 
(c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the 
publisher; and
(d) harm caused by the statement(s).
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558.  Plaintiffs have alleged facts upon which they may 
be entitled to recovery against Defendants for defamation.  Defendants do not contend 
otherwise.  Instead, Defendants make arguments as to why they believe they will prevail 
on this claim.  This is not the purpose of a motion to dismiss.
Defendants first argue that the statute of limitations bars Plaintiffs’ defamation 
claim as far as one of the defamatory statements is concerned.  In this regard, Defendants
rely on the date that the alleged defamatory statement was published by its original 
publisher, Spencer Sullivan, an individual who is not a party to this action.  Defendants 
ignore, however, that Plaintiffs’ defamation claim is based upon the allegations that 
Defendants adopted as their own and published the defamatory statements after the 
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statements’ original publication date.  Assuming these facts to be true, as the Court must, 
it is clear that Plaintiffs have alleged facts upon which relief may be granted against 
Defendants on the defamation claim.  
Defendants next argue that one or more of the defamatory statements are not 
actionable as a matter of law or are subject to the defense of truthfulness.  Here, 
Defendants improperly focus on the merits of Plaintiffs’ defamation claim rather than on 
the sufficiency of the allegations contained in the Complaint.  For this reason also, 
Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ defamation claim must me denied.
Finally, Defendants dedicate a significant amount of time to their argument that 
Plaintiffs’ defamation claim is subject to dismissal because Defendants are entitled to 
immunity under the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (the “CDA”).  
However, Defendants’ reliance on this argument at this stage in the proceeding is 
misguided.  
In Hy Cite Corporation v. BADBUSINESSBUREAU.COM, LLC, 418 F.Supp.2d 
1142 (D.Ariz. 2005), the seller of dinnerware and cookware brought an action against 
Defendants and a limited liability company owned or controlled by Defendants.  There, as 
here, Defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims for defamation citing the 
immunity afforded by the CDA.  The court held that whether the Defendants were entitled 
to immunity under the CDA could not be determined on a motion to dismiss.  418 F.Supp 
at 1149.  Central to the court’s holding was the question whether Defendants could be 
considered to have created or developed the allegedly wrongful content posted on their 
website.  418 F.Supp.2d at 1148-1149.  The same question exists in this case.  
Here, Plaintiffs have alleged that the Defendants adopted the defamatory content 
posted on its website as its own.  This allegation could support a finding that Defendants 
are responsible for the creation or development of the defamatory content and, therefore, 
not entitled to immunity under the CDA.  Indeed, this fact once proven, will render the 
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CDA inapplicable.  Under these circumstances, and as instructed by Hy Cite, whether 
Defendants are entitled to immunity under the CDA cannot be determined at this stage of 
the case.
III. CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged facts upon which relief may be granted against 
Defendants for enforcement of a foreign judgment and for defamation.  Defendants do not 
genuinely dispute the sufficiency of the allegations upon which Plaintiffs’ claims are 
based.  Instead, Defendants argue for a determination of the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims at 
this early stage in the proceeding.  Because the purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test 
the sufficiency of the pleadings that constitute the claim, and not to resolve arguments 
about facts or the merits of a case, Defendants’ motion must be denied.
DATED this 14th day of August, 2007.
QUARLES & BRADY LLP
Renaissance One
Two North Central Avenue
Phoenix, AZ  85004-2391
By s/André H. Merrett
Deana S. Peck
André H. Merrett
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Global Royalties, 
Ltd. and Brandon Hall
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on August 14, 2007, I electronically transmitted the attached 
document to the Clerk’s Office using the CM/ECF System for filing.
Copy mailed to:
Honorable Frederick J. Martone
United States District Court
Sandra Day O’Connor U.S. Courthouse, Suite 526
401 West Washington Street, SPC 62
Phoenix, AZ  85003
/s/ Lisa Fox
Case 2:07-cv-00956-FJM   Document 16   Filed 08/14/07   Page 7 of 7
